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The Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games have 
already served one very important purpose: helping 
to thaw inter-Korean relations. President Moon Jae-
in’s engagement policy and invitation to North Korea 
to resume dialogue was accepted by the Kim Jong-
un regime in January 2018. The Olympic Games have 
now provided Pyongyang with an excellent reason to 
launch a charm offensive and show its willingness 
to engage with Seoul. This could and should be the 
first step towards improving inter-Korean relations, 
which is necessary for North Korea to realize its 
economic reforms. After the Pyeongchang games, 
though, the ball is in Pyongyang’s court to make 
this happen.
President Moon has been clear since his election 
campaign and election itself less than a year 
ago: engagement is a central component of his 
North Korea policy, to the extent that pressure on 
Pyongyang is but a means to induce inter-Korean 
rapprochement. The games have served to put this 
policy into practice. Above all, the Koreas are fielding 
a joint women’s hockey team – a decision strongly 
pushed by the Moon administration in spite of some 
domestic opposition. Furthermore, both Koreas have 
hosted joint cultural events. And President Moon 
has reportedly told his top aides that North Korea’s 
participation in the games is a “valuable opportunity 
to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear 
issue.” The Moon administration has even openly 
mulled that the Kaesong Industrial Complex and 
Mount Kumgang resort could be reopened.
Seoul’s openness to engagement with Pyongyang is 
a golden opportunity for the Kim regime to continue 
to press with economic reforms. Frequent visitors 
to North Korea, defectors leaving the country and 
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traders in the Sino-North Korean border report that 
the marketization of the North Korean economy 
continues apace. Without markets, most North 
Koreans would not be able to feed for themselves as 
a result of the decades-long collapse of the centrally-
planned economy. The Jangmadang generation 
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to ease inter-Korean tensions, make it ever-
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reforms, and put South Korea in the driving 
seat of Korean Peninsula affairs. 
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born during or shortly before the great famine of 
the 1990s knows no other economic model. The 
Kim regime has accepted this reality, and does 
not seem bent on reversing the marketization of 
the country’s economy. Indeed, the government 
is implementing a series of reforms aimed at 
further liberalising the North Korean economy 
and attracting foreign direct investment and other 
sources of revenue – including ski resorts such as 
the Masik Pass, now being promoted during the 
Pyeongchang games.
North Korea’s reforms, however, will fail if 
Pyongyang insists on juche or self-reliance. In the 
same way that China’s and Vietnam’s economic 
reform and opening up processes would have not 
been possible without external support, North 
Korea’s reforms can only be successful with the 
help of foreign investment and expertise. This is 
why Pyongyang needs to be very careful not to 
undermine President Moon’s engagement policy, 
which currently has the support of well over half 
of the South Korean population. The goodwill that 
most South Koreans could show to their Northern 
neighbours and the economic support that one of 
the most developed economies in the world could 
provide cannot be matched by any other country. 
For many South Koreans, supporting North Korea 
is not a choice but a duty towards the country’s 
poor brother. This applies to President Moon.
But Pyongyang has to earn and maintain South 
Korea’s goodwill and support. Missile and even 
nuclear tests are not red lines for the Moon 
government. But a programme of continuous 
tests, recurring sudden cancellations of scheduled 
events as has happened in the past, and incessant 
gratuitous insults in Rodong Sinmun would test 
Seoul’s patience. It is to be hoped that Pyongyang 
understands this and shows its readiness to 
decrease tensions and focus on economic and 
other types of engagement. Arguably, now that the 
Kim regime has developed its nuclear deterrence 
and feels safer it can more fully embrace economic 
openness. This might seem fanciful, but then 
this was also the case when Deng Xiaoping in 
China and Nguyen Van Linh in Vietnam put their 
respective countries on the path towards reform. 
More recently, Myanmar’s military junta also seems 
intent in opening up the country.
The question is whether the Moon government 
should continue to support engagement with North 
Korea following the Pyeongchang games, even if 
the Kim regime sometimes might disappoint with 
its behaviour. The answer is a resounding yes. 
Economic support for North Korea and political 
and cultural exchanges will ease tensions in the 
Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, the greater the 
level of engagement with Pyongyang, the more 
expensive and difficult it will become for the Kim 
regime to reverse course. Engagement also serves 
to admonish Pyongyang when it misbehaves 
more effectively than through public statements. 
Plus, inter-Korean exchanges put Seoul firmly in 
the driving seat of developments in the Korean 
Peninsula. This last point should not be overlooked, 
for South Korea often complaints that the US can 
be guilty of developing its policy towards North 
Korea without properly consulting with Seoul – or 
worse, after only talking to Japan or China.
The greatest legacy of the Pyeongchang games 
could thus be the launch of a new and long-
lasting period of rapprochement between both 
Koreas. The Moon government has made clear that 
engagement is its policy of choice. The games have 
given the Kim regime an opportunity to reciprocate, 
now that its nuclear deterrence is safely in place. It 
is now up to Pyongyang to continue down the road 
of economic reform with the generous support that 
Seoul has shown to be willing to provide.
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